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Like Homer's hero Odysseus, who
was confronted with the impossible
challenge of safely navigating between
Scylla, a terrifying monster, and
Charybdis, a gigantic whirlpool, federal
appeals courts are caught between two
conflicting legal principles in cases
involving the constitutionality of federal
child pornography statutes. The United
States Supreme Court unanimously held
in New York v. Ferber that the First
Amendment did not prohibit the
regulation of child pornography even if it
was not obscene under the famous
standard set out in Miller v. California.'
Child pornography is one of the most
difficult problems facing judges today,
both for those who are concerned about
* Susanna Frederick Fischer is Assistant Professor of Law at Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America in Washington D.C. Comments and questions regarding this article can be sent to
her at fischer@law.edu.
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upholding First Amendment protections
and for those who are concerned about
protecting children from exploitation and
abuse. Child pornography is on the
increase in American society today. New
digital technologies have made it simple
and cheap to produce, disseminate, and
receive still images and video. Digital
technologies also make it easier for
producers, purchasers and users of child
pornography to remain anonymous. As a
result, the availability of child
pornography on the Internet has
exploded in recent years. 2
In this essay, I assume, without
attempting to prove, that child
pornography is a serious social problem
that the law should combat. 3 My focus
here is on the constitutional parameters
of that fight: whether the commerce
power authorizes the application of
federal law to the wholly intrastate
possession of child pornography.
Since the 1970s, Congress has
enacted and amended several child
pornography laws, which now ban,
among other things, the knowing
transportation or shipment of child
pornography in interstate or foreign
commerce; the knowing receipt or
distribution of child pornography in
interstate or foreign commerce; and the
knowing sale of child pornography that
has been shipped in interstate or foreign
commerce. 4 These federal statutes also
criminalize the knowing possession of
child pornography in certain
circumstances. 5  For material to be
treated as child pornography, current
federal law requires a visual depiction of
a minor under the age of eighteen
engaging in sexually explicit conduct, a
digital or computer generated image that
is indistinguishable from a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in such
conduct, or a "morphed" image created,
adapted, or modified to make it look like
an identifiable minor is engaging in such
conduct.
6
The Court underscored its differing
treatment of obscenity and child
pornography in its rulings in two cases
involving the individual possession of
such materials. In Stanley v. Georgia,
the Court held that a state or federal
government cannot constitutionally
criminalize possession or viewing of
obscene material by an individual at
home, because "[o]ur whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power
to control men's minds." 7 However, in
Osborne v. Ohio, the Court refused to
extend its holding in Stanley to the
possession of child pornography, finding
that the state's compelling interest in
protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of minors trumped the
individual's right to receive information
in the privacy of his or her home.
8
Osborne v. Ohio involved the
constitutionality of a state law. But as a
result of Osborne, Congress enacted
federal legislation criminalizing the
possession of child pornography. 9
Current federal law provides for federal
jurisdiction over possession offenses,
even where the connection to interstate
commerce is much more remote than the
child pornography itself traveling across
state lines. Two different statutory
provisions prohibiting the knowing
possession of child pornography, 18
U.S.C. § 2252 and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A,
contain virtually identical jurisdictional
elements (at 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B),
respectively). Both provide for federal
jurisdiction where child pornography has
been produced using materials, such as
film or cameras, which have been
transported across state lines by any
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means including, by computer.10 The
courts have interpreted the term
"produced" to include not only the
original creation of child pornography,
but also the copying or downloading of a
pornographic image." These
"jurisdictional hooks" are often termed
the "materials-in-commerce prongs."
There is also a virtually identical
materials-in-commerce prong in the
"manufacturing" provision of 18 U.S.C. §
2251(a), which prohibits manufacturing
child pornography using materials
transported in interstate commerce.
Another manufacturing provision, 18
U.S.C. § 2251(b), which prohibits parents
and guardians from manufacturing child
pornography using such materials, also
has the same jurisdictional hook.12 The
constitutionality of these materials-in-
commerce prongs under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution
is currently open to debate. A number of
federal circuit courts of appeals have
disagreed as to whether federal law can
constitutionally be applied to the
intrastate possession and viewing of
child pornography where the
pornography did not enter into interstate
commerce and where the government did
not prove that the possessor of the
pornography intended to sell it. Some of
these courts have taken a different
approach to the possession of homemade
pornography and that of commercial
pornography. However, none of them
has upheld a facial challenge to the
materials-in-commerce prongs.13
Recent Supreme Court decisions
have placed federal courts of appeals in
an impossible situation when ruling on
Commerce Clause challenges to the
materials-in-commerce prongs. Like
Odysseus facing the dilemma of sailing
safely between the six-headed monster,
Scylla, who could simultaneously snatch
six crewmen from a passing ship in her
jaws, and the whirlpool Charybis,
powerful enough to suck down his ship,
these federal appeals courts are caught
between two jurisprudential dangers
that the Court's recent precedent directs
them to avoid.1 4 One danger, often called
the "non-infinity principle," is of harm to
federalism and state sovereignty caused
by judicial failure to respect
constitutional limits on the commerce
power by giving the federal government
unlimited power to regulate all activity,
including activity that has historically
been the province of the states, such as
criminal conduct. 15 The other danger,
posed by an overly constrained judicial
interpretation of the commerce power,
threatens the separation of powers. This
is the risk that courts will fail to accord
appropriate deference to the judgment of
the legislative branch of government by
violating the "aggregation principle."
Under this principle, courts traditionally
have upheld regulation of intrastate
activity lacking any individual effect on
interstate commerce if Congress has a
rational basis for its belief that the
activity forms part of a general practice
that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 16
The Supreme Court has recently
attempted to steer safely between these
dangers by finding that the power to
aggregate is generally limited to
intrastate activity that is economic or
commercial.1 7  But the Court has not
succeeded. It has not yet provided clear
guidance as to the meaning of economic
or commercial, nor has it overruled prior
precedent that seems clearly inconsistent
with this limitation.
The Supreme Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has led
to predictably unfortunate consequences.
Since the course charted by the Supreme
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Court is both unclear and difficult to
reconcile with its prior precedent, it is
not surprising that federal courts have
disagreed over the extent to which the
application of the materials-in-commerce
prongs to the intrastate possession of
pornography is a valid exercise of
commerce power. This essay will
examine this disagreement in more
depth after considering the climate of
"new federalism" in which it has arisen.
It will compare and contrast the different
ways these courts have attempted to
reconcile the aggregation and non-
infinity principles, starting by
considering the most recently decided
case at the time of writing, United States
v. Maxwell, in which the Eleventh
Circuit upheld an as-applied commerce
clause challenge to a federal child
pornography possession statute. It will
compare and contrast Maxwell's
reasoning with circuits that rejected
similar challenges, as well as the two
circuits that have also upheld similar as-
applied challenges. It will conclude by
contending that, as Odysseus learned to
his dismay, there is no really safe middle
course that does not violate either the
aggregation principle or the non-infinity
principle. Like Odysseus, the Supreme
Court needs to choose one principle over
the other. The Court has the opportunity
to make such a choice in a case pending
before the Court at the timing of this
writing, Raich v. Ashcroft, involving a
Commerce Clause challenge to the
enforcement of federal law against the
users and producers of medical
marijuana. Although the subject matter
of Raich is different than the child
pornography cases, it involves similar
legal principles. The Court's decision in
Raich has the potential to resolve the
dilemma faced by federal appeals courts
caught between the non-infinity and
aggregation principles.
I. The "New Federalist"
Context
The scope and interpretation of the
commerce power has been the subject of
heightened debate over the past decade
as a result of two highly controversial
Supreme Court decisions, United States
v. Lopez'8  and United States v.
Morrison.19 The Commerce Clause is one
of the enumerated powers that give
Congress the authority to legislate in
certain limited areas. The clause itself
provides that Congress has the power "to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."20  As the Eleventh
Circuit has recently commented, "[ft]ime
has borne out that the text of the
Commerce Clause is no model of
clarity."
21
Although for many decades of the
twentieth century the Supreme Court
imposed virtually no restrictions on
congressional authority to legislate
under the Commerce Clause, in 1995 the
Supreme Court announced in Lopez that
there are limits. In Lopez, the Supreme
Court invalidated a federal statute
(barring the knowing possession of
firearms in a school zone) as an
unconstitutional exercise of commerce
power for the first time in six decades.
22
According to Lopez, there are only three
areas of activity that Congress can
constitutionally regulate under the
Commerce Clause. 23 First, Congress can
validly regulate the persons or things
that travel in interstate commerce; and
second, Congress can regulate the
channels of interstate commerce. 24
Finally, Congress can regulate intrastate
activity that bears a substantial
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relationship to interstate commerce, or,




Prior to Lopez, the Court upheld
many pieces of federal legislation on the
basis of the aggregation principle,
including regulations of intrastate coal
mining, intrastate extortionate credit
transactions, intrastate hotels catering
to interstate travelers, restaurants using
interstate supplies, and, in perhaps the
most extreme example of a broad
construction of the commerce power, a
farmer's wholly intrastate growth and
consumption of wheat in Wickard v.
Filburn.26  Pre-Lopez cases tested the
constitutionality of such legislation
under rational basis review, which
requires courts to defer to legislative
findings that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce if there is any
rational basis for such findings. 27  In
Lopez, while the Court announced limits
on the commerce power, it did not
overrule this category of cases, despite
Justice Thomas' contention in a
concurring opinion, that it should have
done so. Nor did it provide clear
guidelines for determining when
intrastate activity could be aggregated to
meet the substantial effects test.28
Morrison, however, provided some
further guidance in holding that a part of
the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) that created a civil remedy for
victims of violent crimes motivated by
gender violated the commerce power.29
In Morrison, the Court enumerated four
factors for determining whether
intrastate activity meets the substantial
effects test: (1) whether the statute
regulates commercial activity "or any
sort of economic enterprise"; (2) whether
the statute has any "express
jurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set [of cases] that
additionally have an explicit connection
with or effect on interstate commerce";
(3) whether the statute or its legislative
history includes "express congressional
findings regarding the effects upon
interstate commerce" of the intrastate
activity; and (4) whether the link
between the intrastate activity "and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce
was attenuated."30
Morrison clarified Lopez to some
extent, though not enough. For example,
Morrison made clear that the mere
existence of congressional findings
setting out a connection between the
regulated activity and an effect on
interstate commerce would not
automatically render a federal statute a
constitutional exercise of the commerce
power.31 The Court reiterated an earlier
statement that "[slimply because
Congress may conclude that a particular
activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it
so."32 Additionally, it emphasized the
importance of the economic or
commercial character of the activity,
stating "[w]hile we need not adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in
order to decide these cases, thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have
upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that
activity is economic in nature."33  The
Court also stated "the dissent cannot
persuasively contradict Lopez's
conclusion that, in every case where we
have sustained federal legislation under
Wickard's aggregation principle, the
regulated activity was of an apparent
commercial character."
34
Lopez and Morrison, both 5-4
decisions, are generally viewed as part of
a series of "New Federalist" decisions in
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which a consistent group of five current
Supreme Court justices, Scalia, Thomas,
Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O'Connor, have
sought to uphold what they term the
"first principles" of federalism underlying
a constitutional system with dual federal
and state sovereignty. 35 The remaining
four justices, Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Souter, have criticized this approach
as a misguided return to the
"formalistically contrived confines of
commerce power" applied by the Court
prior to the New Deal, as well as
endangering the ability of the political
branches of government to govern
effectively in a modern era.
36
Both Lopez and Morrison prompted a
storm of academic commentary, some,
not surprisingly, lambasting the
decisions as misguided, excessively
activist, unprincipled, and setting out
unworkable standards. 37 Others praised
the decisions as reasonable and likely to
safeguard individual liberty.38 Still other
academic critics, while agreeing with the
outcome of Lopez and Morrison, criticized
the Court's reasoning in those cases as
flawed.
39
Despite this outpouring of criticism
of Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme
Court unanimously accepted the
existence of substantive limits on the
commerce power in Jones v. United
States, narrowly interpreting a federal
criminal arson statute that had a
jurisdictional hook prohibiting arson of
property "used in interstate commerce"
in order to avoid "grave and doubtful
constitutional questions."
40
Although they clearly establish that
limits on the commerce power do exist,
Lopez, Morrison, and Jones left a large
number of unanswered questions about
these limits.4 1  Among these are the
following: how should courts construe
commercial or economic activity when
deciding whether the substantial effects
test of Lopez is met? When does
Congress have constitutional authority
to aggregate intrastate activities to meet
the substantial effects test? To what
extent can the presence of a
jurisdictional element in a statute save
that statute from unconstitutionality
where it limits the statute's reach to
activities with only a minimal, as
opposed to substantial, effect on
interstate commerce? How much weight
should courts give to whether the activity
being regulated is traditionally an area
of state concern, such as the states' police
power with respect to criminal activity?
How should the four Morrison factors be
weighed against each other? Since Lopez
did not defer to the government's
judgment that the activity at issue
affected interstate commerce, and
Morrison went even further in this
direction by refusing to defer to
congressional findings (stating "whether
particular operations affect interstate
commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to
regulate them is ultimately a judicial
rather than a legislative question, and
can be settled finally only by this
Court"), is rational basis review still the
test for constitutionality under the
commerce power?
42
In a 2003 case, The Citizens Bank v.
Alafabco, the Supreme Court, in a per
curiam decision, reaffirmed the validity
of the aggregation principle set out in
Wickard in the context of determining
whether a debt-restructuring agreement
had a sufficient nexus with interstate
commerce such that an arbitration
provision in the agreement would be
enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act.43 In Alafabco, the Court
criticized the lower court for its
"improperly cramped view" of the
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commerce power, noting that although
this power had limits, Lopez did not
"purport to announce a new rule
governing Congress' Commerce Clause
power over concededly economic
activity."44  The Court held that
"Congress' Commerce Clause power 'may
be exercised in individual cases without
showing any specific effect upon
interstate commerce' if in the aggregate
the economic activity in question would
represent 'a general practice ... subject
to federal control."'45  In such a
circumstance, "[o]nly that general
practice need bear on interstate
commerce in a substantial way."
46
Alafabco, however, did not shed any light
on how courts should draw the line
between economic and non-economic
activity in future cases where that was
an issue.
In these circumstances, the
predictable result has been inconsistency
among the federal courts of appeals. In a
number of cases involving the validity of
convictions for intrastate possession of
pornography, federal appeals courts have
differed as to the applicability of the
aggregation principle. They have also
differed over the constitutional effect of
the jurisdictional hook. The next three
sections examine these differences,
starting with the latest decision.
II. United States v. Maxwell:
The Most Recent Federal
Court of Appeals Decision on a
Commerce Clause Challenge
to a Federal Child
Pornography Possession
Statute
The most recent federal circuit court
of appeals ruling on a Commerce Clause
challenge to a federal law prohibiting the
possession of child pornography was
United States v. Maxwell, decided on
October 1, 2004.47 Maxwell provides a
good example of a court confronted with
the dilemma posed by the non-infinity
and aggregation principles. In Maxwell,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed defendant
James Maxwell's convictions for
knowingly possessing child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B). 48 Although Maxwell had
mounted both facial and as-applied
challenges to the statute in the district
court, his appeal was limited to an as-
applied challenge.
49
Maxwell's landlord, Alberta Wallace,
had given him permission to use her
computer.50 When Maxwell moved out to
serve a prison sentence for an unrelated
state offence, he gave Wallace power of
attorney over his affairs for the period
when he would be gone. 51 He also gave
her permission to access his e-mail
accounts. 52 When Wallace did so, she
found messages about homosexuality and
teenagers that caused her to suspect that
Maxwell had been accessing, and might
possess, child pornography. 53 Maxwell's
angry reaction to her questions did not
allay her suspicions, and she contacted
the police.5 4 When the FBI searched her
apartment, they seized more than one
hundred items, including a zip disk that
held several hundred images of child
pornography.5 5 Wallace later found, in
Maxwell's room, a floppy disk which
contained fifteen images of child
pornography and she sent that to the
FBI.56 Maxwell was indicted on two
counts of possessing child pornography,
one predicated on the zip disk and the
other on the floppy disk.5 7 Although the
FBI seized other storage media,
including additional zip and floppy disks
that also contained images of child
pornography, this evidence was not
NEXUS
charged against Maxwell in his
indictment.
58
The government prosecuted Maxwell
for intrastate activity, namely his
knowing possession of pornography
within Florida.59  The government
presented no evidence that Maxwell had
acquired the pornographic images
outside Florida. 60  Nor did the
government establish that the disks
containing the images traveled across
state lines after the images were stored
on them, although Maxwell stipulated
that the disks had been manufactured
outside Florida and had been mailed,
shipped, or transported in interstate
commerce.
61
The government had thus not
established that the images of child
pornography were objects in interstate
commerce that, according to Lopez,
Congress could regulate.62 Nor did the
possession statute concern the channels
of interstate commerce. 63 So the crucial
question was whether Maxwell's
possession, entirely within Florida, of
pornographic images stored on computer
disks that had previously traveled across
state lines, was an activity that fell into
the third Lopez category permitting
federal regulation: intrastate activity
that "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. 64
Writing for a three-judge panel of the
Eleventh Circuit, former Chief Judge
Gerald Tjoflat found that 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B) was unconstitutional as
applied. The court reached its conclusion
on the basis of a detailed analysis of the
applicability of the four Morrison factors
discussed above. 65
First, the Eleventh Circuit panel
found that Maxwell's possession of child
pornography wholly within the state of
Florida was not commercial or economic
activity: "[t]he act of possession alone -
the only act for which Maxwell was
charged - entails no transactions, no
consumption of goods or services, and no
necessary resort to the marketplace."
66
In so ruling, the panel distinguished
Wickard v. Filburn, one of the pre-Lopez
cases that Lopez had not overruled, and
Morrison also left standing.67  In
Wickard, the Court had found that a
piece of New Deal legislation, the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, could
constitutionally be applied to penalize a
farmer for growing more wheat than the
law permitted to be sold and consumed
on a farm. 68 The Court focused on the
economic purpose of this federal
legislation, which was to increase the
market price of wheat by reducing the
supply for sale in the national
marketplace, and concluded that even
local production and consumption of
wheat would adversely affect this goal.
69
In Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit
sought to distinguish Wickard on two
related grounds. The Court determined
that the federal child pornography
statute at issue lacked the clear
economic purpose that the Agricultural
Adjustment Act had. Child pornography
law was not designed to encourage the
trade in pornography at an increased
price.70  Since its purpose was to
criminalize the possession of child
pornography, the provision at issue in
Maxwell was essentially a regulation of
criminal conduct that, like the
noneconomic criminal conduct at issue in
Lopez, was the province of the states
rather than of the federal government. 71
Child pornography, unlike the wheat at
issue in Wickard, was a "nonrival" good.
The mere possession of child
pornography did not reduce the overall
supply of such material.7 2 The second
ground the Court cited was that the
statute at issue was not an attempt to
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reduce interstate trade in materials used
to produce pornography, such as disks,
cameras, and film.
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
other Circuits that had found the
aggregation principle applicable to the
intrastate possession of child
pornography, since such possession was
not economic in nature. 73  Citing
Morrison and Lopez, the Eleventh
Circuit contended that although the
Supreme Court had not adopted a
categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any non-economic activity,
federal regulation of intrastate activity
under the commerce power had only been
upheld by the Court where the regulated
activity was economic or commercial in
nature.7 4 It concluded that Congress had
the power to regulate interstate child
pornography only because that
pornography was a thing in interstate
commerce, not because such pornography
had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce in the aggregate. 75
The Eleventh Circuit also reasoned
that if the aggregation principle could be
applied to the intrastate possession of
child pornography, there would be no
need for any jurisdictional hooks in the
statute.76 Jurisdictional hooks would be
superfluous if intrastate possession of
pornography was always deemed to have
a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce. 77 Additionally, the
Eleventh Circuit noted the risk that
aggregation would encourage
overregulation "with a fatter regulatory
brush."
78
A second Morrison factor was
whether the federal legislation at issue
lacked a jurisdictional hook that ensured
that the intrastate activity it was
regulating had a sufficient connection to
interstate commerce. 79 The possession
statute at issue in Maxwell did have a
jurisdictional hook allowing the
government to prosecute the possession
of child pornography where it had been
produced using materials that had been
transported in interstate commerce. But
because virtually all child pornography
would be produced using materials like
film, video, and cameras that had
traveled in interstate commerce, this
jurisdictional hook did not require the
prosecution to prove that the possession
substantially affected interstate
commerce and was thus not sufficiently
limited to establish, on its own, that that
the statute was constitutional as applied
to convict Maxwell.
8 0
A third Morrison factor the Court
considered was whether the legislation
contained express congressional findings
as to the effects on interstate commerce
of the activity being regulatedsl The
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the
Morrison Court had made clear that the
mere existence of such findings did not
definitively establish the legislation's
constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause.82 In any event, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that the congressional
findings for the original version of
section 2252A did not support the
conclusion that the intrastate possession
of child pornography had a sufficient
effect on interstate commerce such that
its regulation, as applied to Maxwell,
was a valid exercise of the commerce
power.8 3  Although these findings
included the finding that child
pornography "inflames the desires of
child molesters, pedophiles, and child
pornographers who prey on children" and
thus "increas[es] the creation and
distribution of child pornography," there
was no evidence that Maxwell was a
child molester or that his individual
possession of pornography would directly
or substantially encourage the interstate
NEXUS
market for child pornography and
interstate commerce generally.
84
Additionally, although there was a
finding in the legislative history of 18
U.S.C. § 2252, a similar child
pornography possession statute, that
"[c]hild pornography and child
prostitution have become highly
organized multimillion dollar industries
that operate on a nationwide scale[, and]
such prostitution and the sale and
distribution of such pornographic
materials are carried on to a substantial
extent through the mails and other
instrumentalities of interstate and
foreign commerce," the Eleventh Circuit
discounted this finding as focusing only
on interstate child pornography but
saying nothing about the effects of
intrastate or noncommercial child
pornography on the interstate market.
8 5
Considering the final Morrison
factor, the Eleventh Circuit also found
that the effect of Maxwell's mere
possession of two disks containing child
pornography on interstate commerce was
"attenuated to say the least" where the
only connection between Maxwell's
activity and interstate commerce was
that the disks had originally come from
out of state.8 6  The Eleventh Circuit
stated "[tihe causal chain necessary to
link his activity with any substantial
impact on interstate commerce might be
long enough to reach the outer limits of
the solar system."87  The Eleventh
Circuit therefore concluded that
Maxwell's possession of child
pornography was quintessentially local
in character since the government had
not established that he had obtained it
through any channel of interstate
commerce, or that he had distributed any
pornography in the interstate market.8
8
Furthermore, when Maxwell's possession
was viewed on its own, there was no
evidence that it encouraged others to
seek more pornography and thereby
increased the demand for such
pornography in the interstate market.
8 9
The mere fact that the two charged disks
had traveled interstate prior to Maxwell
storing pornography on them was simply
insufficient to make his possession of
pornography the constitutionally
appropriate subject of Commerce Clause
regulation. 90
III. Federal Circuits Differing
from Maxwell in Rejecting
Constitutional Challenges to
Federal Child Pornography
Laws Under the Commerce
Clause
The approach of Maxwell differed
from that taken by some other federal
circuit courts of appeals in rejecting as-
applied and facial challenges to federal
child pornography law under the
Commerce Clause. 91 The vast majority
of these courts did not assess the
constitutionality of the materials-in-
commerce prong in the provision at issue
in Maxwell, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B),
Most of them considered its virtually
identical counterpart in the alternate
possession statute at 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B). A few analyzed the
constitutionality of the materials-in-
commerce prongs in the manufacturing
provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (b).
The reasoning of these federal circuit
courts of appeals differed from that of
Maxwell in two main ways. First, a few
of these courts, most notably in the
Eighth Circuit, considered the existence
of the jurisdictional hook to be a far more
persuasive factor in favor of
constitutionality than the Eleventh
Circuit had found in Maxwell.92 Second,
some other courts disagreed with the
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first group's assessment of the
significance of the jurisdictional hook,
but nevertheless upheld the
constitutionality of the statutes on the
basis of the aggregation principle.93 The
Fourth Circuit has used reasoning
combining elements of both approaches,
apparently basing a finding of
constitutionality in one case on both the
existence of the jurisdictional hook and
the aggregation principle, although the
precedential value of this decision is
questionable since it is unpublished.
94
The remainder of this section considers
this case law in more detail.




A relatively small number of courts
have held that the mere existence of the
jurisdictional hooks in sections
2252(a)(4)(B), 2251(a), and 2251(b)
rendered these provisions constitutional.
For example, in United States v.
Robinson, one reason given by the First
Circuit for finding section 2252(a)(4)(B)
facially constitutional was that, unlike
the statute at issue in Lopez, section
2252(a)(4)(B) has a jurisdictional
element which "requires an answer on a
case-by-case basis to the question
whether the particular possession of
child pornography affected interstate
commerce." 95 In United States v. Bausch,
the only reason given for the Eighth
Circuit's holding that section
2252(a)(4)(B) was not facially
unconstitutional under the Commerce
Clause was the presence of a
jurisdictional element ensuring "through
a case-by-case inquiry, that each
defendant's pornography possession
affected interstate commerce."96
Although both Robinson and Bausch
were decided before Morrison, two other
Eighth Circuit decisions after Morrison,
United States v. Hoggard and United
States v. Hampton, relied on similar
reasoning in rejecting Commerce Clause
challenges to the materials-in-commerce
prongs in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2251(b),
and 2252(a)(4)(B). 97  These courts
considered themselves to be bound by the
reasoning in Bausch. In Hoggard, a case
involving photographs depicting the
defendant's wife and small children
engaging in sexual activity, the Eighth
Circuit found the materials-in-commerce
prong in section 2251(b) to be
constitutional because it has an "explicit
jurisdictional nexus."9 8 It distinguished
both Morrison and Lopez on the basis
that the statute at issue in both those
cases had no jurisdictional hook
"requiring the government to prove, in
each case, a concrete connection with
interstate commerce." 99 In Hampton, a
case involving the production and
possession of homemade child
pornography, the Eighth Circuit found
the materials-in-commerce prongs in
section 2251(a) and 2252(a)(4)(B)
survived constitutional attack on the
basis that Bausch, as affirmed by
Hoggard, was controlling authority. The
Eighth Circuit cited to Lopez and
Morrison but did not analyze either case,
simply stating "[s]ince those cases were
decided.., we have held that Bausch
continues to control the constitutionality
of federal criminalization of child
pornography produced with materials
that have traveled in interstate
commerce and accordingly affirmed a
conviction under § 2251(b)."100
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B. Circuits Doubting the
Sufficiency of the
Jurisdictional Hook to Render
the Materials-in-Commerce
Prongs Constitutional but
Upholding Them on the Basis
of the Aggregation Principle
A second group of courts, including
the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, as
well as a First Circuit decision after both
Robinson and Morrison, seriously
doubted that the mere existence of the
jurisdictional hook, considered on its
own, was sufficient to automatically
render the materials-in-commerce prongs
in the federal child pornography
possession and manufacturing statutes
constitutional. Nevertheless, these
courts sustained the materials-in-
commerce prongs in 18 U.S.C. §§
2252(a)(4)(B) and 2251(a) against a
number of facial and as-applied
constitutional challenge on the basis of
the aggregation principle. The Seventh
Circuit also has expressed its essential
agreement with this reasoning, although
without actually ruling on the
jurisdictional hook issue.
For example, in United States v.
Rodia, which was decided after Lopez but
prior to Morrison, the Third Circuit
found that it was constitutional under
the Commerce Clause for Congress to
enact the materials-in-commerce prong
in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and apply it
to convict Rodia. 01  Rodia, a very
unsavory defendant who had a prior
conviction for endangering the welfare of
a child, was convicted under section
2252(a)(4)(B) for his wholly intrastate
possession of numerous Polaroid photos
of child pornography where the film used
to create the pornography had traveled
in interstate commerce.10 2  He argued
that the statute's regulation of purely
intrastate possession of pornography was
unconstitutional based on the non-
infinity principle. 10 3  Rodia also
contended that the possession statute's
jurisdictional hook was insufficient to
ensure that it would be applied to
activities with a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce.
10 4
The Third Circuit agreed with Rodia
that this jurisdictional hook was
probably not sufficiently limited that it
could, by itself, render the statute
constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, since virtually all child
pornographers would use materials that
had traveled in interstate commerce, like
film or cameras.10 5 It stated:
[a]s a practical matter, the limting
jurisdictional factor is almost useless
here, since all but the most self-sufficient
child pornographers will rely on film,
cameras, or chemicals that traveled in
interstate commerce and will therefore
fall within the sweep of the statute. At
all events, it is at least doubtful in this
case that the jurisdictional element
adequately performs the function of
guaranteeing that the final product
regulated substantially affects interstate
commerce
0 6
However, the Third Circuit disagreed
with Rodia as to whether there was a
sufficient nexus between intrastate
possession and interstate commerce,
finding, though "not without misgivings
in view of the breadth of the regulation
at issue" that "Congress rationally could
have believed that child pornography
that did not itself travel in interstate
commerce has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, and is thus a valid
subject of regulation under the
Commerce Clause."10 7  In other words,
Congress could have rationally believed
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that the possession of homemade (or,
using terminology evoking Wickard,
"home-grown") pornography would
stimulate the demand for pornography
from other sources and thus affect the
interstate pornography market.
0 8
The Third Circuit applied
Congressional findings in the legislative
history of previous versions of section
2252 to the amended version at issue,
finding that these findings supported the
reasonable conclusion that a substantial
national market in child pornography
existed.10 9 The Third Circuit also found
support in the legislative history relating
to subsequent amendments to section
2252.110 According to the Third Circuit,
there was support in this legislative
history that pornography was addictive,
which led to the rational belief that even
wholly intrastate possession of child
pornography would have substantial
effects on the interstate market for child
pornography."'
The Rodia court did not rule that
intrastate possession of child
pornography was itself economic or
commercial activity, but took the view
that the aggregation principle
articulated by the Court in Wickard
permitted Congress to regulate non-
commercial intrastate activity if "such
events, taken in the aggregate, might
ultimately have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce." 1' 2  In support of
this approach, the Third Circuit cited the
following passage from Wickard: "[e]ven
if appellee's activity be local and though
it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."11 3  The Third Circuit
considered this aggregation principle to
be a generic principle that was not
limited to situations like Wickard where
the intrastate activity, the production
and consumption of wheat, was
substituting for wheat purchased in
interstate commerce.114 According to the
Third Circuit, the aggregation principle
thus also applied to cases of "supply-
affecting situations," even if the effect on
interstate commerce was more
speculative than in a substitution
situation, "requir[ing] a greater number
of assumptions before the connection
between intrastate and interstate
activity becomes clear."'15
Even though the Rodia decision
predated Morrison, the Third Circuit
endorsed its reasoning after Morrison in
United States v. Galo. This case involved
dozens of home-grown images of child
pornography in the possession of another
highly unsavory defendant who had
previously been convicted of state law
offenses of corruption of minors,
endangering the welfare of children, and
indecent assault arising from his sexual
activity with his niece and nephews."
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The Third Circuit rejected Galo's facial
and as-applied constitutional challenges
to the materials-in-commerce prongs in
2252(a)(4)(B) and 2251(a), finding itself
bound by Rodia and refusing to accept
Galo's argument that Rodia was wrongly
decided, although it did not cite or
discuss Morrison.117 Instead, the court
followed the reasoning of Rodia that the
jurisdictional hook was not sufficiently
limited to automatically render the
statute constitutional, but Congress
could criminalize purely intrastate
possession with no direct link to
interstate commerce when Congress
could have rationally believed that the
intrastate activity created a demand for
pornography that substantially affected
interstate commerce.118 The Court held
that the same reasoning applied to the
production of homemade pornography
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since both statutes had the same
jurisdictional hook.119 Another very
recent Third Circuit decision, United
States v. Randolph, a case involving the
production of homemade pornography by
a defendant with a history of criminal
sexual acts, viewed Galo as binding
authority and therefore rejected both
facial and as-applied constitutional
challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). 12 The
Third Circuit did not cite either Lopez or
Morrison in its opinion in Randolph.
In finding that the aggregation
principle permitted Congress to regulate
the intrastate possession of child
pornography, the Third Circuit in Rodia
had relied on the First Circuit's decision
in United States v. Robinson.121 After
the defendant in Robinson was convicted
under section 2252(a)(4)(B) of possessing
fifty apparently home-grown instant
photographs of teenage boys engaging in
sexual conduct, he challenged his
conviction on the basis that the statute
was an unconstitutional exercise of the
commerce power.'2 2 As well as reasoning
that the existence of a jurisdictional hook
rendered the statute constitutional, the
First Circuit also relied on a market
theory to support its conclusion that
Congress had the power to enact section
2252(a)(4)(B) to regulate activity with a
substantial effect on interstate
commerce.123 Relying on some of the
same legislative history as Rodia, the
First Circuit concluded that possession of
child pornography, "'through repetition
elsewhere,' . . . helps to create and
sustain a market for sexually explicit
materials depicting minors" and thus
substantially affects the
instrumentalities of interstate
commerce." 124 It distinguished Lopez as
not involving possession that affected
interstate commerce. 125
Although the First Circuit decided
Robinson prior to Morrison, it also relied
on the aggregation principle in its post-
Morrison decision in United States v.
Morales-De Jesus, in which it upheld the
constitutionality of the materials-in-
commerce prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
against both facial and as-applied
challenges. 126 The defendant in Morales-
De Jesus was another unsavory person
who, after luring his thirteen-year old
god-daughter to a motel and videotaping
her engaging in sexual conduct with him
on several occasions, was convicted for
his manufacture of homemade
pornography.
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In Morales-De Jesus, the First
Circuit specifically considered the
applicability of the four Morrison factors,
agreeing with the Third Circuit in Rodia
that the jurisdictional element was likely
not sufficient, on its own, to render the
statute constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. 128 However, the First
Circuit found that the general sphere of
activity being regulated by the statute,
the production of child pornography, was
unquestionably an economic activity,
even if the defendant's individual
intrastate activity did not itself affect
interstate commerce. 129 The defendant's
activity thus fell into the class of activity
that Congress could properly regulate.
30
According to the First Circuit,
producing child pornography fueled the
supply side of the market, following the
reasoning of Robinson that possessing it
affected demand."' It ruled that federal
regulation of intrastate production of
pornography could be sustained under
the aggregation principle, reasoning that
because much of this home-grown
pornography would surreptitiously enter
the national market and would be
impossible to trace, Congress had
authority to regulate intrastate
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production in order to reduce the supply
of pornography in the interstate
market.
132
The First Circuit suggested that not
all as-applied challenges would be ruled
out by this approach. In some
circumstances, the production or
possession of child pornography might
not be within the sphere of activity that
Congress sought to regulate. 133 The First
Circuit found that there was legislative
history indicating that Congress had
chosen to regulate the production and
possession of child pornography because
of its concerns about the exploitation of
children. 34 If, in the circumstances of a
particular case, there was no
exploitation, an as-applied challenge
could be successful. 35  Relevant facts
could include the age of the minor and
the relationship between the defendant
and the minor.136
After Morrison, the Second Circuit
also upheld a conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a) in United States v. Holston on
the basis of the aggregation principle,
rejecting the defendant's facial and as-
applied challenges to the
constitutionality of section 2251(a)'s
materials-in-commerce prong in a case
involving the production of homemade
child pornography, namely several videos
depicting the defendant engaging in
sexual activity with the ten-year-old and
fourteen-year-old daughters of a
neighbor.137  The Second Circuit
specifically considered the Morrison
factors, and cited Rodia in support of its
doubts as to whether the jurisdictional
hook was sufficiently limited in its
application to render the provision
constitutional.1 38 But the Second Circuit
concluded that the materials-in-
commerce prong was constitutional, both
on its face and as applied to defendant's
intrastate conduct, because the activity
that was being regulated (producing
child pornography) was an economic and
commercial activity. 139 Additionally, the
Second Circuit found that there were
ample legislative findings that there was
an extensive national market in child
pornography that relied on the
instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. 140 It concluded that Congress
could rationally have determined that it
was necessary to regulate intrastate
activity to effectively regulate that
national market.'4 ' Although the Second
Circuit did not cite the Wickard decision,
it was clearly applying the aggregation
principle in finding that it was not
necessary for the defendant's individual
activity to itself affect interstate
commerce for it to be validly regulated,
as long as Congress was regulating a
class of activities that substantially
affected interstate commerce. 42  In a
subsequent decision, United States v.
Harris, the Second Circuit rejected as-
applied and facial challenges to the
materials-in-commerce prong in 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), the same
possession statute that was at issue in
Maxwell, on the basis that Holston was
binding precedent that could not be
distinguished "in any meaningful way,
but without describing the defendant's
precise activities .'143
In another post-Morrison case, a
Fifth Circuit panel, 2-1, rejected facial
and as-applied challenges to section
2252(a)(4)(B) in United States v.
Kallestad, a case involving the
defendant's possession of a large number
of sexually explicit images, some of
minors, that he had made in his home
after advertising in a newspaper for
participants. 4 4 Applying the Morrison
factors, the Fifth Circuit found that the
jurisdictional hook in section
2252(a)(4)(B) was insufficient on its own
NEXUS
to render the statute constitutional,
effectively following Rodia in this regard,
although without citing it in support of
this contention.' 45 The Fifth Circuit did
find the jurisdictional hook to be more
useful than the Rodia court in that it
"limit[s] prosecutions under section
2252(a)(4)(B) to a smaller universe of
provable offenses" and "reflects
Congress's sensitivity to the limits on its
commerce power."'
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However, the Fifth Circuit concluded
in Kallestad that the statute was
constitutional, employing reasoning
similar to the market theory of Rodia
and Robinson. The Fifth Circuit found
that the defendant's activity being
regulated was economic in nature, when
"viewed broadly," citing in support
Wickard's statement that "when a person
produces for their own consumption a
product that is traded in an interstate
market, his conduct is economic in
character."'147 Relying on congressional
findings that it viewed as supporting the
existence of a substantial national
market in child pornography, the Fifth
Circuit therefore found that Congress
could have rationally concluded that it
needed to regulate intrastate possession
to regulate the national market for
interstate pornography. 148  In dissent,
Judge E. Grady Jolly argued that the
simple possession at issue, which did not
involve buying or selling, was not
sufficiently economic or commercial to be
aggregated under Morrison and Lopez. 149
The reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Angle was also quite
similar to that of Rodia. The defendant
in Angle was a purchaser of commercial
pornography with prior convictions for
child molestation and sodomy, who had
used the Internet to have sexually
explicit conversations with an
undercover FBI agent posing as a
child. 150 In rejecting a facial challenge to
18 U.S.C. §2252(a)(4)(B), the Seventh
Circuit doubted, but found it
unnecessary to rule on, the issue of
whether the jurisdictional hook is
sufficient to render the statute
constitutional.15 ' The remainder of the
Seventh Circuit's opinion endorsed the
market theory of Rodia and Robinson.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
First Circuit in Robinson and the Third
Circuit in Rodia that there were
congressional findings supporting the
existence of a large national market for
child pornography and that Congress
had a rational basis for believing that the
intrastate possession of child
pornography bore a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce by
stimulating demand for interstate
pornography. 52  The Seventh Circuit
stated "there is a nexus, via a market
theory, between interstate commerce and
the intrastate possession of child
pornography."' 53  The Seventh Circuit
distinguished Lopez and (in a footnote)
Morrison for the reason that the statutes
at issue in those cases were "directed
only to noneconomic criminal activity."'
54
C. The Fourth Circuit
Combines Elements of Both of
the Above Approaches
In an unpublished per curiam
opinion after Morrison in United States
v. Harden, the Fourth Circuit used
reasoning combining elements of both
the approach in Bausch and Rodia in an
appeal involving a conviction for
intrastate possession of over 100
photographs of young boys, some as
young as eleven. 155 Rejecting a facial
challenge to section 2252(a)(4)(B), the
Fourth Circuit simply stated without
explanation that it was following
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Robinson and Bausch.156 This seems to
amount to an endorsement of the
reasoning in Bausch that the mere
existence of the jurisdictional hook is
sufficient to protect the statute from a
facial challenge.
157
In its ruling, the Harden court
inaccurately stated that the First and
Eighth Circuits were the only ones to
have yet addressed this issue. But at the
time that Harden was decided, several
other circuits had in fact addressed the
issue, namely the Third Circuit in Rodia
and Galo, the Fifth Circuit in Kallestad,
and the Seventh Circuit in Angle. They
were all critical of the approach of the
First and Eighth Circuits. 158 Moreover,
the Fourth Circuit failed to note in
Harden that, in United States v. Corp,
the Sixth Circuit had preferred the
approach of Rodia to that of the First
and Eighth Circuits' reasoning of the
jurisdictional hook, despite the fact that
Harden actually cited Corp on a different
issue. 159
Additionally, in rejecting an as-
applied challenge to the same provision,
the Fourth Circuit found that the
government had established a sufficient
nexus to interstate commerce due to the
large amount and type of pornographic
images at issue, the youth and number of
the boys depicted in the images, and the
fact that the defendant had admitted to
sexual conduct with multiple young
boys. 60 The analysis in Harden did not
discuss the Morrison factors, but this
part of its opinion referred to Corp, a
case that did include a full analysis of
these factors. 161  The reasoning of the
Harden Court is sketchy, but it appears
to follow the reasoning of Corp, though
distinguishing it on the facts. Corp in
turn relied on the reasoning in Rodia,
but distinguished it on the basis that
where there was no exploitation on the
facts, the possession at issue could not be
viewed as connected to interstate
commerce. 62  By relying on and
distinguishing Corp, Harden was
implicitly following the reasoning in
Rodia.
In an earlier unpublished per curiam
decision after Morrison, United States v.
White, a case involving the downloading
of hundreds of pornographic images from
the Internet (and thus, according to the
Court, the pornography itself moved
across state lines), the Fourth Circuit
had also rejected the argument that the
materials-in-commerce prong in section
2252A(a)(5)(B), the provision at issue in
Maxwell, did not satisfy the Commerce
Clause, citing Bausch and Robinson in
support but not mentioning any of the
other child pornography cases, Lopez, or
Morrison.
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IV. Circuits Aligned with
Maxwell in Upholding
Constitutional Challenges
Under the Commerce Clause
The Eleventh Circuit is not the only
federal appeals court to uphold a
constitutional challenge to the materials-
in-commerce prongs. Two other federal
circuits have upheld as-applied
challenges to the constitutionality of
these provisions. Both appeals
concerned the materials-in-commerce
prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). No
facial challenges to the materials-in-
commerce prongs in the child
pornography possession or
manufacturing statutes have been
upheld to date.
Maxwell invoked the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit, in United States v. McCoy,
a case involving the possession of a
single family photograph taken by a
drunken mother of her daughter, which
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was not intended for economic or
commercial use and had not been
transported across state lines.16 4 The
defendant was prosecuted under section
2252(a)(4)(B), and federal jurisdiction
was premised on the fact that the camera
and film used to take the picture had
traveled in interstate or foreign
commerce from their places of
manufacture. 165 A majority of a three-
judge Ninth Circuit panel found that
section 2252(a)(4)(B) could not be
constitutionally applied under the
Commerce Clause to the defendant's
intrastate possession of this photograph
because it did not satisfy the substantial
effects test. 166 Judge Stephen Reinhardt,
writing for the majority, found that the
defendant's activity failed to satisfy what
he deemed the two most important
Morrison factors, namely whether the
interstate possession was commercial or
economic and whether the connection
between such possession and interstate
commerce was too attenuated. 167 Nor
could section 2252(a)(4)(B) be
constitutionally applied to "others
similarly situated, whose non-
commercial, non-economic possession of a
prohibited photograph is entirely
intrastate in nature."' 68 ,
In McCoy, the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the Third Circuit's reasoning in
Rodia that the jurisdictional hook was,
practically speaking, useless as a
guarantee that the statute was
constitutional as applied. 169  But the
Ninth Circuit was critical of much of the
other reasoning in Rodia. It condemned
Rodia's addiction theory as "not only
rhetorically unpersuasive, but premised
upon a legal analysis that can no longer
be sustained after Morrison", castigating
it as being overly speculative and "piling
inference upon inference."'170  It also
criticized the Third Circuit's reliance on
subsequent legislative history.' 71  The
Ninth Circuit also disagreed with Rodia's
implicit assumption that child
pornography was a fungible good,
because, on the facts of McCoy, it was not




intrastate activity on its own, the Ninth
Circuit found that there was no proof
that the defendant would enter the
interstate child pornography market,
stating
[w]e see no more justification for
assuming that a possessor of a 'home-
grown' photograph of one's own child will
ultimately enter the interstate
pornography market as an addict than
there is to assume that the possessor of a
single marijuana cigarette will inevitably
turn into a full-time heroin junkie. 1
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It found no support in the legislative
history for a sufficiently direct or
substantial relationship between the
intrastate noncommercial possession of
pornography and a national market in
commercial child pornography to validate
congressional regulation of intrastate
possession.174  The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "simple intrastate
possession of home-grown child
pornography not intended for
distribution or exchange is not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity"
and found that Wickard's aggregation
principle was therefore inapplicable to
it.175
In dissent, Judge Stephen Trott
preferred to follow the market theory of
Rodia, contending that even though the
defendant's individual conduct had no
effect on interstate commerce, Congress
could regulate it on the basis of the
aggregation principle. The reasons for
this were that the statute could be
characterized as regulating commercial
or economic activity, namely the massive
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national industry of child pornography; it
had an express jurisdictional element
restricting its application to activities
that had an explicit connection with, or
effect on interstate commerce;
congressional findings existed to support
the judgment that purely local
possession impacted interstate
commerce; and Congress could have
rationally concluded that the regulated
activity had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.1 76 In Judge Trott's
opinion, no as-applied challenge could be
successful where the defendant's
conduct, like McCoy's, fell within the
plain language of the statute.
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In another Ninth Circuit decision
that followed McCoy, United States v.
Adams, a different three judge panel
ruled unanimously that section
2252(a)(4)(B) was facially
constitutional.178  This Ninth Circuit
panel found that the jurisdictional hook
violated the non-infinity principle, citing
in support a statement in the majority
opinion in McCoy that it "not only fails to
limit the reach of the statute to any
category or categories of case that have a
particular effect on interstate commerce,
but, to the contrary, it encompasses
virtually every case imaginable, so long
as any modern-day photographic
equipment or material has been used."'
79
But the Ninth Circuit also found that the
defendant's possession of commercial
child pornography, namely images
downloaded from a website (in contrast
to the home-grown pornography at issue
in McCoy) did have a nexus to interstate
commerce and that link was not so
attenuated as to preclude congressional
power to regulate intrastate activity.
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The only other circuit to sustain an
as-applied challenge to the
constitutionality of section 2252(a)(4)(B)
is the Sixth Circuit. In United States. v.
Corp, the circuit ruled that the section
was unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant's possession of homemade
pornographic images.181 These images
showed the defendant engaged in sexual
conduct with a sixteen-year-old who was
very close to the age of majority and who
did not want the defendant prosecuted.
1 8 2
Applying the Morrison factors, the Sixth
Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the
Third Circuit in Rodia that the mere
existence of the jurisdictional hook is not
enough to automatically render the
statute constitutional. 8 3 But the Sixth
Circuit did not follow Rodia's reasoning
on aggregation, distinguishing it on the
facts. It stated that "we do not
determine the aggregate effect on
interstate commerce of the purely
intrastate dealing in child pornography.
Instead, we conclude that Corp's activity
was not of a type demonstrated
substantially to be connected or related
to interstate commerce on the facts of
this case."'18 4 This conclusion was based
on the facts that the defendant was not
engaged in sexual activity with a young
child and was not using the images for
abusive or commercial or semi-
commercial purposes.1 8 5  Given this
finding, the Sixth Circuit declined to
decide whether the defendant's activity
was "commercial" within Morrison and
did not opt to strike down the statute as
facially unconstitutional. 8 6 But in order
to come to the conclusion that
aggregation was inappropriate, the Sixth
Circuit must have impliedly determined
that defendant's conduct was
noneconomic and non-commercial.
In Corp, the Sixth Circuit suggested
that in determining whether there was a
sufficient nexus with interstate
commerce, courts should consider the
factual circumstances carefully, and ask
whether
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[t]he activity in this case related to
explicit and graphic pictures of children
engaged in sexual activity, particularly
children about fourteen years of age or
under, for commercial or exploitive
purposes? Were there multiple children
so pictured? Were the children otherwise
sexually abused? Was there a record that
defendant repeatedly engaged in such
conduct or other sexually abusive conduct
with children? Did defendant move from
place to place, or state to state, and
repeatedly engage in production of such
pictures of children?1
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The Court specified that "[t]hese
question are relevant to a determination
on a case-by-case basis about whether
the activity involved in a certain case
had a substantial effect on commerce."'
8 8
This part of the decision is not at odds
with the approach of the Rodia line of
authority on aggregation. In Morales-De
Jesus, a decision that endorsed Rodia's
market theory on aggregation, the First
Circuit took the view that some types of
non-exploitative intrastate possession or
production of pornography could be the
subject of a successful as-applied
challenge, because such activity was
outside the "class of activity which bears
the substantial relationship to interstate
activity that justifies action by Congress
under the Commerce Clause."'189
V. The Significance of the
Disagreement: Choosing
Between Scylla and Charybdis
To summarize, there is disagreement
among the federal circuit courts of
appeals on two primary issues: (1)
whether the mere existence of the
jurisdictional hook automatically renders
the materials-in-commerce provisions
constitutional under the Commerce
Clause; and (2) when the aggregation
principle permits congressional
regulation of wholly intrastate
possession of child pornography under
the commerce power. For both issues,
the disagreement can be viewed as the
product of some judicial misreading of
the majority opinions of the Supreme
Court in Lopez and Morrison. However,
simply exhorting courts to more carefully
apply precedent will not enable them to
steer a safe course between the Scylla of
violating the non-infinity principle and
the Charybdis of violating the
aggregation principle. The middle course
charted by the Supreme Court, which
generally limits aggregation to economic
or commercial intrastate activity, is
flawed. It is inconsistent with prior
Supreme Court precedent, and also fails
to provide lower courts with guidance on
how economic and commercial activity
should be construed.
A. Disagreement Over the
Effect of the Jurisdictional
Hook
The disagreement over the effect of
the jurisdictional hook is clearly
attributable to misreading or ignoring of
the Court's majority opinions in Lopez
and Morrison. As discussed above, after
both Lopez and Morrison, the Eighth
Circuit rejected facial Commerce Clause
challenges to materials-in-commerce
provisions in child pornography
possession and production statutes
where the possession and manufacturing
at issue was wholly intrastate, based on
the mere presence of the jurisdictional
hook.190 This approach was also taken
after Morrison in an unreported Fourth
Circuit decision, as well as before
Morrison by the Eighth Circuit and First
Circuit.' 9 However, most other circuits
(the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth,
and Eleventh, and the First after
Morrison) have not followed the Eighth
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Circuit's approach in cases involving
various facial and as-applied challenges
to the materials-in-commerce provisions
in the child pornography possession and
production statutes.192  Rather, they
have preferred the approach of the Third
Circuit in Rodia on this issue, which
found that the mere presence of a
jurisdictional hook did not automatically
render a statute constitutional unless it
actually limited the statute's reach to
activities that substantially affected
interstate commerce. The Rodia court
found it doubtful that the jurisdictional
hook in these statutes actually provided
such a guarantee. As the Eleventh
Circuit noted in Maxwell, it is not
permissible for
Congress to achieve power beyond its
constitutional reach simply by uttering
pretextual incantations evoking the
phantasm of commerce .... It follows
that Congress cannot guarantee the
proper the use of its authority by creating
jurisdictional hooks that relate to
interstate commerce in some way but fail
in all cases to confine the scope of its
regulation to Constitutional boundaries.
This fact is obvious to the point of
tautology: if a statute's jurisdictional
element is not sufficiently restrictive to
cabin the statute's reach to permissible
applications, then the element is no
guarantee of constitutional application. 193
The Rodia approach is more
consistent with Morrison than the
Eighth Circuit's approach, since
Morrison did not state that the mere
presence of a jurisdictional element in a
statute will automatically render that
statute constitutional under the
Commerce Clause (nor would the
absence of a jurisdictional hook render
the statute automatically
unconstitutional).1 94  Rather Morrison,
citing Lopez, held that the presence of a
jurisdictional hook may (as opposed to
must) render a statute constitutional
under the Commerce Clause where that
jurisdictional element "might limit [the
statute's] reach to a discrete set ... of
[intrastate] possessions that additionally
have an explicit connection with or effect
on interstate commerce." 195 Additionally,
Morrison also stated that such a
jurisdictional element will only "lend
support" to the argument that the
statute is constitutional, but will not
definitively establish its
constitutionality.196 Lopez also indicated
that what is crucial for a jurisdictional
element is that it "ensure[s], through
case by case inquiry," that the possession
at issue affects interstate commerce. 197
Although neither Lopez nor Morrison
made clear how much weight should be
afforded to the existence of a
jurisdictional hook, both decisions do
plainly establish that it is crucial for
constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause that a jurisdictional element
actually limit the statute's regulation to
activities that have an "explicit
connection with or effect on interstate
commerce."19s
It is true that by using the adjective
"explicit", neither Lopez nor Morrison
made clear whether such a connection
must be substantial or can only be
minimal. Since the existence of a
jurisdictional hook is a factor in support
of the substantial effects test, it seems to
follow that the word "explicit" is being
used synonymously with "substantial"
(as Rodia required). 199 But even if the
nexus need not be substantial, the
materials-in-commerce prongs would still
not satisfy the requirements of Lopez and
Morrison. The activity that these child
pornography statutes are regulating is
the possession or production of
pornographic images, not the materials
that are used to make such pornography.
But the jurisdictional nexus is based on
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the effect of such materials on interstate
commerce, not on the effect of the
pornography made out of those materials
on interstate commerce. These
jurisdictional hooks therefore do not
operate to limit the activity being
regulated to activity with an effect on
interstate commerce, whether
substantial or otherwise.
An additional problem with these
jurisdictional hooks, from the point of
view of Lopez and Morrison, is that they
do not comport with the "non-infinity
principle" that warns that the commerce
power cannot constitutionally "be
extended so as to embrace effects upon
interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of
our complex society, would effectually
obliterate the distinction between what
is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government.
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As Rodia noted, since it is virtually
impossible for child pornography to be
made using no material that has ever
crossed state lines, the jurisdictional
hooks in the federal child pornography
possession statutes do not contain any
effective limits. Thus, they cannot be
enough to render these statutes
constitutional on their own.
According to the Fourth Circuit in
Harden, decided after Morrison, the
jurisdictional hook in section
2252(a)(4)(B) was sufficient to render the
statute facially constitutional, but not
necessarily constitutional as applied.
But, as noted above, not only is Harden
an unreported per curiam decision, but
its reasoning is open to criticism because
it completely ignored several prior
decisions in other circuits that addressed
the same issue in a very different way in
the context of both facial and as-applied
challenges (including Rodia, Galo, Corp,
Kallestad, and Angle).20 1 Moreover,
Harden's reasoning that the Eighth
Circuit approach applies to facial
challenges is not consistent with Lopez
and Morrison for the same reasons that
the Eighth Circuit's approach is
problematic.
In a survey of lower court decisions
on the constitutionality of federal
regulations under the commerce power,
Professors Brannon Denning and Glenn
Reynolds concluded that "[t]here is
evidence from the lower courts' opinions
that they are still reluctant to take Lopez
seriously, even after Morrison's clarifying
opinion."20 2  The Eighth and Fourth
Circuit decisions on the effect of the
jurisdictional hook are examples of the
type of sloppy reasoning that Denning
and Reynolds have described as "per
curiam or unpublished opinions that
simply refer to post-Lopez cases" or
"published decisions that merely
announce the conclusion that nothing in
the Supreme Court's post-Lopez cases
affects the reviewing court's earlier
decision, often with little or no
analysis."
20 3
Denning and Reynolds think
misreading of Morrison is not so much
attributable to judicial ideology as it is
the tendency of overburdened federal
judges using "shortcuts to decision
making" in an effort to clear their
dockets quickly, particularly of appeals
by unsavory defendants like child
pornographers. 20 4  It is true that the
defendants whose convictions for child
pornography possession have been
upheld can be viewed as generally more
unsavory than those whose Commerce
Clause challenges were upheld. Many of
the unsuccessful appeals were mounted
by defendants who had previous
convictions involving some type of sex
crime, especially crimes against children,
or who were in possession of large
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amounts of pornography depicting
multiple children, or who engaged in
sexual activity with young children.
20 5
In contrast, all three of the successful as-
applied challenges involved cases with
significant mitigating facts, including a
very small number of images in the
possession of the defendant, a lack of
evidence that the defendants were child
molesters or were likely to enter the
interstate pornography market, and, in
one case, images depicting sexual
activity with a minor who was very close
to majority.20 6  But since the
jurisdictional hooks in each case were
identical, these factual differences do not
justify taking a different approach to the
effect of the jurisdictional hook.
If this disagreement over the effect of
the jurisdictional hook was all there was
to the Circuit split, it would seem easy
enough to resolve by simply urging
courts to more carefully apply the Court's
precedent and avoid the non-infinity
danger. But it is not so simple to resolve
the split since it also includes





The disagreement over aggregation
and economic activity has also resulted
from judicial misreading or, in some
cases, ignoring of Lopez and Morrison.
20 7
Morrison emphasized the importance of
economic activity to aggregation,
contending that prior Supreme Court
precedent uniformly supports limiting
the permissible scope of regulation under
the commerce power to intrastate
activity that is "economic in nature" or of
an "apparent commercial character,"
though declining to set out a categorical
rule absolutely banning aggregating the
effects of any non-economic activity.
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Two (Ninth and Eleventh) of the three
circuits (Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh)
which have upheld as-applied challenges
to the constitutionality of the materials-
in-commerce prongs in section
2252(a)(4)(B) found aggregation
inappropriate because they concluded
that the intrastate possession at issue
was not economic or commercial in
nature. 20 9 In the view of the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, the market theory of
Rodia, endorsed by the Second, Third,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, as well as
the First Circuit following Morrison,
which was the basis for their findings
that the aggregation principle was
applicable to purely intrastate possession
or production of pornography, violates
Morrison's restriction of aggregation to
intrastate economic activity as well as
the non-infinity principle. 210
But the disagreement over
aggregation is in reality more
complicated than just a misreading of
Morrison; it is also attributable to
Morrison's own misreading of earlier
authority. Morrison cited an earlier
case, Wickard, in support of its general
limitation of aggregation to intrastate
activity that is economic in nature.
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But a close reading of Wickard does not
seem to support this restriction. The
Court in Wickard stated
[blut even if appellee's activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, and this irrespective
of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as
'direct' or 'indirect.'212
This passage from Wickard was cited in
Lopez, which Morrison purported to
endorse and apply, but, on its plain
NEXUS
meaning, does not support the limitation
to economic intrastate activity posited by
Morrison.
An additional difficulty with
Morrison's purported limitation of
aggregation to economic or commercial
activity is that the Court provided no
guidance as to how lower courts are to
determine when activity is economic or
commercial. As many critics of Morrison
(including Justice Breyer in his
dissenting opinion joined, in relevant
part, by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg) have charged, this economic or
commercial test sets an unworkable
standard because it is too difficult to
apply and does not comport with much of
the Court's prior precedent that was
endorsed by the majority.
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As a result of these difficulties, the
Court has made it impossible for lower
courts to steer a safe course between
Scylla, demanding respect for the non-
infinity principle, and the Charybdis,
demanding respect for the aggregation
principle. Supreme Court review has
unsuccessfully been sought for a number
of the federal appeals courts' decisions on
the constitutionality of the materials-in-
commerce prongs of the federal child
pornography laws. But at the time of
this writing, the Supreme Court has a
case under review that supplies the
opportunity to resolve the tension
between the non-infinity principle and
the aggregation principle, and to thus
better guide courts faced with future
challenges to the constitutionality of
child pornography possession statutes.
VI. An Opportunity for
Resolving the Commerce
Clause Dilemma in Federal
Child Pornography Cases:
Ashcroft v. Raich
This case, Ashcroft v. Raich, does not
involve child pornography, but even so,
offers the opportunity to resolve the
Commerce Clause dilemma in federal
child pornography cases. Rather, it
concerns Commerce Clause challenge to
the federal Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) as applied to the intrastate
possession, cultivation, or use of
cannabis for medical treatment. The
Supreme Court was asked to rule on the
government's appeal against the Ninth
Circuit's ruling that the respondents,
patients who are using and/or growing
cannabis entirely within the State of
California to treat or alleviate their
serious medical conditions, are entitled
to preliminary injunctive relief
preventing enforcement of the CSA
against them.
21 4
At first glance, the Raich case might
be seen as giving rise to more serious
federalism or state sovereignty concerns
than the child pornography cases
discussed above. There is a direct clash
between state and federal policy with
respect to medical marijuana, but this is
not the case for the intrastate possession
of child pornography. All states have
criminalized such possession, and
virtually all have done so without any
requirement of distribution or the intent
to distribute the child pornography. 215
But as Justice Kennedy pointed out in
his concurring opinion in Lopez, even
where the states and federal government
have shared policy goals, they may
disagree about how to carry out such
goals.21 6  Justice Kennedy stated "[in
this circumstance, the theory and utility
Susanna Frederick Fischer
of our federalism are revealed, for the
States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to
devise various solutions where the best
solution is far from clear."
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In Raich, the government argued
that Wickard is controlling authority
because the respondents are engaged in
"economic activity" that is analogous to
the home-grown production of wheat in
Wickard, in that respondents "are
producing a fungible commodity for
which there is an established market."
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The government pointed out in its
written submissions to the Court that, in
Wickard, the Court upheld congressional
regulation of intrastate wheat production
even though such activity "may not be
regarded as commerce" and the wheat
was not "sold or intended to be sold.
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Respondents countered that Wickard
is distinguishable because the wheat at
issue in that case was produced as part
of the "quintessentially economic
activity" of a commercial farming
operation, and most of the excess
production was used to support that
activity by feeding livestock rather than
the farmer's family, whereas the
cannabis at issue in Raich was cultivated
entirely for non-commercial reasons.
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Echoing the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Raich, the respondents
contended that whether the commodity
at issue can be freely exchanged or sold
is less significant than whether it is
meant entirely for personal use with no




that if Wickard is held to be controlling,
it should be reconsidered to ensure that
the principles of federalism and state
sovereignty are respected. 222  They
warned that to find for petitioners would
violate the non-infinity principle,
unconstitutionally permit the federal
government to exercise a general police
power, and render the Lopez and
Morrison decisions "dead letters. 223 In
contrast, the government urged the
Court to focus on the need for stability
and predictability, citing the statement
of Justice Kennedy in his concurring
opinion in Lopez that "the Court as an
institution and the legal system as a
whole have an immense stake in the
stability of [the Court's] Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to
this point."
22 4
The Court had not yet handed down
its ruling in Raich at the time this article
was written and I find myself in the
awkward position of speculating in
writing about a ruling that may have
been delivered by the time my words are
published. At the time that I am writing,
it seems quite possible that the Court
will dodge the difficult question of
whether Wickard's aggregation principle
is inconsistent with Lopez/Morrison's
non-infinity principle. It could do so by
deciding Raich on very narrow grounds.
For example, one way to evade the issue
would be to distinguish Wickard on its
facts, as respondents urged in their
merits brief and Justice O'Connor
appeared to support during oral
argument. 225 Another way would be to
distinguish Morrison and Lopez on their
facts and find the intrastate activity at
issue in Raich to fall "on the
constitutional side of the line that
separates the Lopez and Morrison case,"
as the government contended during oral
argument and Justice Breyer seemed, at
that time, to support. 226  But for the
Court to rule so narrowly would be
regrettable, because this would fail to
assist lower courts in future cases who
find themselves in the impossible
situation of attempting to respect the
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non-infinity principle and the
aggregation principle. It would be more
likely to perpetuate the Circuit split than
to lead the Circuits toward a uniform
approach to aggregation.
To assist future courts, the Court
needs to clarify the meaning of
"economic" and "noneconomic", a crucial
distinction according to Lopez and
Morrison, but one that the Court left
vague in those decisions. The
respondents in Raich advocated narrowly
construing economic activity as requiring
some act that amounts to, or gives rise to
sale, barter, or exchange. 227 In contrast,
the government argued that economic
activity is not so limited, but includes the
possession or use of any fungible product
for which there is a market.
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If the Court is true to Morrison's
economic or commercial limitation on
aggregation, then it cannot accept the
government's broader construction of
"economic" because to do so would
effectively collapse the Morrison
majority's distinction between the nature
of the effects on interstate commerce and
the causes of those effects. But, as
Justices Breyer and Souter both pointed
out in separate dissenting opinions in
Morrison, this distinction does not sit
comfortably with the Court's prior
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, such as
the Wickard case, nor with the concept of
a substantial effects test.229 As Justice
Souter pointed out, "if substantial effects
on commerce are proper subjects of
concern under the Commerce Clause,
what difference should it make whether
the causes of those effects are themselves
commercial?"230  Justice Breyer asked,
"why should we give critical
constitutional importance to the
economic, or noneconomic, nature of an
interstate-commerce-effecting cause?"231
Breyer contended that the Court's prior
precedent made clear that "only the
interstate commercial effects, not the
local nature of the cause, are
constitutionally relevant.
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According to Justice Thomas in his
concurring opinion in Lopez, which he
later reiterated in Morrison, the
aggregation principle is flawed because it
"has no stopping point", and thus
violates the non-infinity principle.
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Justices Breyer and Souter also
recognized that there was a conflict
between the aggregation principle and
the non-infinity principle.234 However,
they disagreed that the substantial
effects test needed to be reconsidered.
Instead, Breyer and Souter contended
that the scope of the commerce power
was plenary, or virtually plenary, and
thus it was the non-infinity principle
that should be jettisoned, not the
aggregation principle.235 In support of
this contention, Breyer described the
modern American economy as one in
which, in "practical reality... virtually
every kind of activity, no matter how
local, genuinely can affect commerce, or
its conditions, outside the State."236
Justices Breyer and Souter argued that
it was for Congress, not the courts, to
determine the proper federal-state
balance, and thus traditional rational
basis scrutiny was all that was required
as a test for whether legislation is
constitutional under the commerce
power.
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Hopefully, in its ruling in Raich, the
Court will recognize that the
unworkability of the majority's effort in
Morrison to preserve both the
aggregation principle and the non-
infinity principle. It is also to be hoped
that it will realize that it must choose to
favor one of these principles over the
other. In fact, Homer tells us that this
was Odysseus's situation.
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Odysseus' travel advisor, the goddess
Circe, gave him the unwelcome news
that he would not, in any circumstances,
be able to steer safely past both Scylla
and Charybdis. She told him that he
could either steer close to Charybdis, in
which case his ship would be entirely
sucked into the whirlpool's raging
waters, or close to Scylla, in which case
he would lose at least a half dozen of his
crew to the monster's snapping heads.
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When Homer asked, "Is there no way ...
of escaping Charybdis, and at the same
time keeping Scylla off when she is
trying to harm my men?," the goddess
responded, "You dare-devil, you are
always wanting to fight somebody or
something: you will not let yourself be
beaten, even by the immortals."239 But
she went on to inform him that there was
no safe course that could avoid both
dangers.
240
The same lesson applies to the
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Like Odysseus, the Lopez and Morrison
majorities have sought to avoid both the
dangers of failing to comport with the
non-infinity principle and the
aggregation principle. But as Odysseus
learned to his dismay, this middle course
is not really possible. If the Supreme
Court does not face the fact that it can
choose only one danger to completely
avoid, the likely result will be continued
disagreement among the circuits in
Commerce Clause challenges to the
materials-in-commerce prongs of the
child pornography possession and
manufacturing statutes. Raich offered
the Court the opportunity to face reality
and deliver a landmark ruling that will
clarify the law. Certainly, from a
Homeric perspective, the timing of this
choice would be appropriate. Odysseus'
famous journey lasted for ten years and
it has been almost ten years since the
Court's decision in Lopez.
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